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ONE STRIKE, YOU’RE OUT: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT DENIES SECOND CHANCE  
FOR FIRST-TIME DRUG OFFENDERS 
Vera Zavin* 
Abstract: On July 14, 2011, in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit filed an en banc opinion overruling Lujan-
Armendariz v. INS in holding that, for immigration purposes, constitutional 
equal protection did not require treating state drug crime convictions that 
are expunged under state law the same as federal convictions expunged 
under the Federal First Offender Act. The court also overruled Rice v. 
Holder, holding that being under the influence of a drug is not a lesser of-
fense than simple possession. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit frustrated 
Congress’s intent in enacting the Federal First Offender Act, and hindered 
courts’ ability to ensure equal protection of similarly situated aliens. 
Introduction 
 Flavio Nunez-Reyes is a native and citizen of Mexico who illegally 
entered the United States in 1992.1 In 2001, he pleaded guilty to pos-
sessing and being under the influence of methamphetamine.2 Though 
the California state court dismissed both charges, the federal govern-
ment placed Nunez-Reyes in proceedings to be removed from the 
United States.3 An immigration judge (IJ) denied Nunez-Reyes relief, 
ordered him deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
affirmed.4 Nunez-Reyes appealed, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that Nunez-Reyes’s expunged 
convictions did not render him ineligible for relief from removal.5 Con-
sidering that every other circuit court of appeals addressing the issue 
had rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the Ninth Circuit reheard 
Nunez-Reyes’s case en banc.6 The Ninth Circuit en banc reversed prec-
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5 See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), su-
perseded en banc, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011). 
6 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 689. 
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edent on which the Ninth Circuit panel relied, and denied Nunez-
Reyes’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision.7 Nunez-Reyes there-
fore was ineligible for relief under the Federal First Offender Act 
(FFOA) and could be deported.8 In so doing, the en banc court frus-
trated Congress’s intent in enacting the FFOA, and hindered courts’ 
ability to ensure equal protection of similarly situated aliens.9 
I. Nunez-Reyes’s Conviction and Appeals 
 In 2001, Flavio Nunez-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty in a 
California state court to one felony count of possession of metham-
phetamine, and one misdemeanor count of being under the influence 
of methamphetamine.10 Although Nunez-Reyes pleaded guilty to both 
counts, the court dismissed the charges under California Penal Code 
section 1210.1(e)(1).11 This statute allowed California state courts to 
expunge drug possession convictions on the condition that the defen-
dant successfully completes a drug treatment program and meets cer-
tain other conditions.12 Nunez-Reyes completed the statutory require-
ments, and the judge expunged his convictions.13 Nevertheless, the 
federal government issued a Notice to Appear and charged Nunez-
Reyes with removability.14 
                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 687–88, 690, 695; Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
8 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 687, 695. 
9 See id. at 703–04, 714–15 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
10 Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The felony was 
later reduced to a misdemeanor. Id. at 705 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
11 Id. at 687 (majority opinion). 
12 Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(e)(1) (West 2006), held unconstitutional by Gardner v. 
Schwarzenegger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
At any time after completion of drug treatment and the terms of probation, 
the court shall conduct a hearing, and if the court finds that the defendant 
successfully completed drug treatment, and substantially complied with the 
conditions of probation, including refraining from the use of drugs after the 
completion of treatment, the conviction on which the probation was based 
shall be set aside and the court shall dismiss the indictment, complaint, or in-
formation against the defendant. In addition, except as provided in para-
graphs (2) and (3), both the arrest and the conviction shall be deemed never 
to have occurred. The defendant may additionally petition the court for a 
dismissal of charges at any time after completion of the prescribed course of 
drug treatment. Except as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), the defendant 
shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from 
the offense of which he or she has been convicted. 
Id. 
13 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 687; id. at 705 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
14 See id. at 687 (majority opinion). 
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 Nunez-Reyes applied for various forms of immigration relief.15 He 
applied for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, 
cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure.16 The IJ nonetheless 
deemed the expunged convictions to be convictions under federal im-
migration laws, denied all forms of relief, and ordered Nunez-Reyes 
removed.17 The BIA affirmed, and Nunez-Reyes appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.18 
 The Ninth Circuit panel considered whether Nunez-Reyes’s ex-
punged state convictions for possession and being under the influence 
constituted convictions under immigration laws.19 The panel first 
looked to the FFOA because it governs whether a federal expungement 
for simple possession of drugs constitutes a conviction for immigration 
purposes.20 Congress adopted the FFOA in 1970 as a “limited federal 
rehabilitation statute.”21 Under the FFOA, an alien cannot be deemed 
convicted for immigration purposes if he can show that he has not been 
previously convicted, has never received first offender relief, the convic-
tion was for possession of drugs, and that the court expunged the con-
viction.22 An alien satisfying FFOA conditions could avoid the harsh 
consequences of deportation usually following a drug conviction.23 Yet it 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 705 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
16 Id.; Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), super-
seded en banc, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011). 
17 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 687. The United States Code defines the term “convic-
tion” in the immigration context as 
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication 
of guilt has been withheld, where— 
 (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilt, and 
 (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint 
on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006). 
18 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 687. 
19 Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1103–05. The court reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo but 
limited its scope of review to the grounds relied on by the BIA, as required by law. See id. at 
1103. 
20 See id. at 1104. 
21 Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 2000). 
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2006); Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 705 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS extended the applicability of the 
FFOA not only to drug possession, but also to lesser charges. See 227 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended to allow those convicted of the least serious type of drug 
offenses to qualify under the Act.”), overruled by Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
23 See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 735–36. 
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was federal convictions for simple possession to which the FFOA ap-
plied.24 The panel thus had to determine (1) whether the FFOA also 
applied to expunged state convictions; and (2) whether being under the 
influence constituted a “conviction” for immigration purposes.25  
 The Ninth Circuit panel determined that the FFOA also applied to 
expunged state convictions.26 In so deciding, the panel relied on its 
precedent in Lujan-Armendariz v. INS.27 In Lujan-Armendariz, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought removal of two aliens, 
even though state courts had expunged the aliens’ convictions.28 In 
determining whether the FFOA applied to expunged state convictions, 
the Lujan-Armendariz court recognized that Congress significantly 
amended federal immigration laws in 1996 to clarify when a “convic-
tion” existed for immigration purposes.29 Congress defined conviction 
with respect to an alien as either “a formal judgment of guilt,” or a 
guilty plea where the judge ordered some form of punishment.30 Prior 
to these amendments, the circumstances under which a conviction 
could be expunged differed by state.31 The Lujan-Armendariz court de-
termined that Congress passed the amendments to clarify at which 
point during the legal proceedings a conviction results, rather than 
abandon the rule that vacated convictions could not serve as the basis 
for deportation.32 Constitutional equal protection required that state 
and federal drug convictions be treated similarly under the FFOA.33 
Therefore, the Lujan-Armendariz court held, and the Ninth Circuit pan-
el in Nunez-Reyes agreed, that aliens could not be deported for first-time 
simple drug possession offenses that could have been tried under the 
FFOA but were expunged under a state statute.34 
 The Ninth Circuit panel also determined that being under the in-
fluence of a controlled substance qualifies for FFOA treatment because 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104. 
25 See id. at 1104–05. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 222 F.3d at 732. One alien was convicted for attempted possession of narcotics, and 
the other for simple attempted possession of narcotics. Id. 
29 See id. at 736–37. 
30 See 18 U.S.C § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006); Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742. 
31 See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 735–36. 
32 Id. at 745. The court determined that Congress did not reveal a clear intent to re-
peal the FFOA in the new definition of conviction. See id. at 746. 
33 See id. at 749. 
34 See Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05; Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 744–45, 749. In 
Lujan-Armendariz, the state court had suspended the defendant’s sentence pursuant to a state 
rehabilitative statute and instead ordered five years of probation. See 222 F.3d at 732–33. 
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it is a lesser offense than simple possession.35 The panel relied on Rice 
v. Holder, a Ninth Circuit case with facts similar to those in Nunez-Reyes.36 
Rice, like Nunez-Reyes, was a Mexican citizen convicted of a felony for 
possession and a misdemeanor for being under the influence.37 Al-
though Rice was convicted and served almost two years of probation, 
the court dismissed the complaint and the resulting penalties.38 The 
Rice court relied on Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, which held that possession 
of drug paraphernalia constituted a lesser offense than simple posses-
sion because it was not a crime under any federal statute.39 The Rice 
court found no important distinction between possession of drug para-
phernalia and being under the influence of a narcotic.40 Accordingly, 
the Rice court decided that a misdemeanor conviction for being under 
the influence of a controlled substance also constituted lesser offense 
than simple possession.41 In light of this precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
panel held that Nunez-Reyes’s conviction for being under the influence 
was not a conviction for immigration purposes.42 
 The panel concluded that under Lujan-Armendariz, equal protec-
tion required that state expungements of simple possession be treated 
the same as federal expungements.43 As Nunez-Reyes’s possession con-
viction would not have constituted a conviction for immigration pur-
poses had it been expunged under the FFOA, it did not constitute a 
conviction despite being expunged under a state law.44 Furthermore, in 
light of Cardenas-Uriarte, the panel concluded that Congress intended 
that crimes lesser than simple possession be given FFOA treatment.45 
As Rice held that being under the influence constituted a lesser offense 
than simple possession, Nunez-Reyes’s conviction of being under the 
influence was also a lesser offense under the FFOA.46 Therefore, his 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
36 See id.; Rice v. Holder, 597 F.3d 952, 954, 956 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Nunez-Reyes, 
646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
37 Rice, 597 F.3d at 954; see Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
38 Rice, 597 F.3d at 954. 
39 See id. at 956; Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled 
by Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
40 See 597 F.3d at 956. 
41 See id. at 956–57. 
42 See Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
43 See id. at 1104. 
44 See id. at 1104–05. 
45 See id. at 1104. 
46 See id. at 1104–05. 
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conviction for being under the influence of methamphetamine could 
not preclude him from receiving relief from removal.47 
 The Ninth Circuit reheard Nunez-Reyes’s case en banc because 
every other circuit court of appeals that had addressed the issue had 
rejected Lujan-Armendariz and held the opposite—that state and federal 
expungements should not be treated equally for immigration pur-
poses.48 In conformity with the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit en banc 
reversed the panel’s decision.49 The court held that (1) “equal protec-
tion does not require treating, for immigration purposes, an expunged 
state conviction of a drug crime the same as a federal drug conviction 
that has been expunged under the FFOA[;]” (2) the new rule would 
apply prospectively only; and (3) being under the influence does not 
constitute a lesser offense than simple possession.50 Therefore, Nunez-
Reyes could not receive relief from removal.51 
II. A New Interpretation of Congressional Intent 
 The two key differences between the Ninth Circuit panel and the 
en banc court are their interpretations of Congressional intent regard-
ing the applicability of the FFOA to state convictions, and the meaning 
of an offense lesser than simple possession.52 Unlike the panel, the en 
banc court concluded that Congress may not have intended for state 
and federal expungements to be treated equally.53 In deciding whether 
Congress had “a rational basis for distinguishing between expunged 
federal convictions and expunged state convictions,” the en banc court 
applied “[a] very relaxed form of rational basis review . . . .”54 The 
court reversed Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, finding that Congress could 
have a rational basis for distinguishing between expunged state and 
federal convictions.55 The en banc court reiterated the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in Acosta v. Ashcroft, explaining that Congress may not have 
                                                                                                                      
47 Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
48 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 689. 
49 See id. at 689–90, 695. 
50 See id. at 690, 695. 
51 See id. 
52 See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–90, 695 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Nu-
nez-Reyes v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), superseded en 
banc, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011). 
53 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 688–90 (citing Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2003)). 
54 See id. at 688–89. 
55 See id. at 688–90. 
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wanted the FFOA to apply to state rehabilitative schemes.56 Congress 
may have feared, for example, that dangerous offenders could easily 
plead down simple possession charges as a result of the heavy caseloads 
of state courts.57 The en banc court also noted that not all states allow 
expungement.58 A person convicted in one state may be eligible for 
relief, while someone in another state would not be eligible.59 Rather 
than adopting the states’ fragmented approach, Congress may not have 
wanted to recognize any state expungements in the interest of uniform-
ity.60 Therefore, although a federal conviction expunged under the 
FFOA “shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a dis-
qualification or a disability imposed by law,” the court held that state 
convictions expunged under state law could still be used to preclude 
immigration relief.61 
 The en banc and panel courts also reached different conclusions 
regarding what constitutes an offense lesser than simple possession.62 
Unlike the panel, the en banc court found that being under the influ-
ence could be a more serious crime than simple possession.63 The 
court reasoned that “being under the influence alters one’s sober state 
of mind and carries an immediate risk of dangerous behavior, which 
mere possession does not necessarily create.”64 The en banc court 
therefore overruled Rice v. Holder and concluded that “[t]he BIA did 
not err.”65 Consequently, Nunez-Reyes could not receive relief from 
removal.66 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. at 689–90 (citing Acosta, 341 F.3d at 227). 
57 See id. 
58 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 690 (citing Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1107 (Graber, J., con-
curring)). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2006); Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 688–90. After concluding that the 
equal protection guarantee did not require similar treatment of state and federal ex-
pungements for immigration purposes, the en banc court applied the rule prospectively 
only. Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 690. 
62 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 695; Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
63 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 695; Nunez-Reyes, 602 F.3d at 1104–05. 
64 Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 695 (reasoning that someone could be guilty of simple pos-
session for agreeing to hide drugs for someone else but “not create an immediate risk of 
dangerous behavior”). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 687, 695. 
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III. The Impact of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder frus-
trated Congress’s intent in enacting the FFOA, and hindered courts’ 
ability to ensure equal protection of similarly situated aliens.67 Congress 
adopted the 1996 amendments to federal immigration laws after the 
BIA’s affirmation of its rule that state-expunged first-time drug posses-
sion offenses would be given FFOA treatment.68 Judge Pregerson dis-
sented in the en banc decision, explaining that Congress essentially 
adopted the BIA’s interpretation, and that “when Congress adopts an 
agency interpretation, Congress intends the agency construction to be 
incorporated into the statute.”69 Therefore, “in enacting the 1996 
amendment, [Congress] . . . had no intention of altering the longstand-
ing rule that convictions that are subsequently expunged under either 
federal or state law ‘no longer have any effect for immigration’ pur-
poses.”70 Congress instead intended that expunged state convictions be 
eattr ed as expunged federal convictions under the FFOA.71 The en 
banc court’s reasoning undermines this intent by permitting different 
outcomes depending on whether an alien’s conviction occurred in state 
or federal court.72 
 Congress also intended that the FFOA protect first-time drug of-
fenders from the “harsh consequences” of deportation.73 By allowing 
immigration relief only in federal cases, “the FFOA loses much of its 
efficacy because the relief it offers can be circumvented via the state 
criminal justice system.”74 Such a rule would create an incentive for 
prosecutors to try aliens in state courts, where any resulting expunge-
ment would be ineligible for FFOA treatment.75 As Judge Pregerson 
argued in his dissent, “[w]ithout the equal treatment afforded under 
Lujan-Armendariz, this unfettered prosecutorial discretion may now 
                                                                                                                      
67 See 646 F.3d 684, 703–04, 709–11, 714 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., dis-
senting). 
68 See id. at 711, 714. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 711 (quoting Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 742 n.23 (9th Cir. 2000) 
overruled by Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 
71 See id. at 704, 711, 714 (noting that the result of the majority’s decision is that Nu-
nez-Reyes “will be separated from his citizen wife and two American-born children because 
of a minor drug conviction” that had been expunged in state court after he successfully 
completed a rehabilitation program). 
72 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 708, 711, 714–15 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
73 See id. at 709–10. 
74 Id. at 710. 
75 See id. at 710, 715. 
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be exercised to dispositively determine whether an individual’s first-
time drug offense will yield extremely harsh immigration conse-
pe of drug offense.82 There-
re
ness, compassion, and fundamental fairness.”85 The Ninth Circuit’s 
new rule undermines Congressional intent, and ultimately hinders 
                                                                                                                     
quences; that is, whether any particular defendant will benefit from 
the FFOA.”76 
 Furthermore, the majority only needed to consider whether Nu-
nez-Reyes qualified for relief under the FFOA rather than question the 
viability of Lujan-Armendariz.77 As Nunez-Reyes had not previously been 
convicted, had never received FFOA relief, and had his convictions ex-
punged, he satisfied three of the four FFOA requirements.78 Therefore, 
the court needed only to address whether his conviction for using or 
being under the influence constituted an equivalent or lesser charge 
than simple possession of narcotics.79 According to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Rice v. Holder, being under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance qualified as a lesser offense than simple possession.80 Judge Gra-
ber, concurring with the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision, also recognized 
that no factual distinction existed between Nunez-Reyes and Rice.81 
Moreover, both Congress’s and California’s criminal schemes consider 
being under the influence a less serious ty
fo , under Ninth Circuit precedent, Nunez-Reyes was eligible for 
FFOA treatment and immigration relief.83 
 The Supreme Court has stated that it has “long recognized that 
deportation is a particularly severe penalty . . . .”84 In his dissent, Judge 
Pregerson correctly characterized the opinion of the Ninth Circuit en 
banc majority as a “harsh result, . . . repugnant to the values of kind-
 
e id. at 709 (noting that the court must limit its review to 
grou BIA). 
6. 
52, 956 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Nunez-Reyes, 646 
F.3d
5 (9th Cir. 2010) (Graber, J., concurring), superseded en banc, 646 F.3d 
684 )). 
al quotations omitted) (cit-
ing 
85 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 704 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 715. 
77 See Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 705–07 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Because the BIA dis-
tinguished Lujan-Armendariz from Nunez-Reyes’s case, it was improper for the circuit court 
to reach the issue of its viability. Se
nds considered by the 
78 Id. at 705–0
79 Id. at 706. 
80 Id.; Rice v. Holder, 597 F.3d 9
 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
81 Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 706 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Nunez-Reyes v. Hold-
er, 602 F.3d 1102, 110
 (9th Cir. 2011
82 Id. at 707. 
83 See id. at 706. 
84 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (intern
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)). 
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s decision.87 
                                                                                                                     
courts’ ability to ensure the equal protection of similarly situated 
aliens.86 The en banc court should have upheld the panel’
Conclusion 
 Nunez-Reyes v. Holder raises important issues regarding expunged 
state convictions and whether they should receive FFOA treatment. The 
en banc court brought the Ninth Circuit into conformity with other 
circuit courts of appeals, overruling Lujan-Armendariz v. INS in holding 
that, for immigration purposes, constitutional equal protection does 
not require treating state expunged drug convictions the same as those 
expunged under the FFOA. The court also overturned Rice v. Holder, 
holding that being under the influence was not a lesser offense than 
simple possession. Unfortunately, the en banc’s decision frustrated 
Congress’s intent in enacting the FFOA and wrongly denied Nunez-
Reyes immigration relief. 
 
86 See id. at 704, 711, 714–15. 
87 See id. at 706–08, 711, 714–16. 
